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Abstract
This Article first examines the role of economic and developmental assistance in the context of
peacemaking and then focuses on one specific innovative economic assistance measure: the Qual-
ifying Industrial Zone (“QIZ”) initiative. Part I of this Article describes how addressing the eco-
nomic requirements of the negotiating parties has interplayed with their other requirements within
the overall framework of peacemaking. Specifically, based on the experience gained over the last
thirty years of the Middle East peace process, this Part describes the overarching requirements
that the parties have pursued through peace negotiations. As explained below, former Middle
East warriors have always attempted to ensure that they attain certain minimum political, secu-
rity, and economic threshold objectives in negotiating peace agreements. This Part of the Article,
then, articulates four “laws” of reconciling these three requirements among competing interests,
emphasizing the role of economic assistance. Part II of this Article examines a novel U.S. gov-
ernment initiative that has recently surfaced and gained more significance among other economic
assistance measures that have been offered to proponents of peace in the Middle East. The QIZ
initiative by the U.S. government extends free access to the U.S. market for goods comprised of
components originating in the territories of former adversaries and manufactured inside a jointly-
administered QIZ, established along the borders of the former enemies who are now engaged in
peacemaking. The success of the QIZ initiative, as well as the limitations on additional U.S. gov-
ernment spending to support future Middle East peace agreements, may result in the extension of
the QIZ initiative to additional borders separating former enemies throughout the Middle East.
THE QUALIFYING INDUSTRIAL ZONE
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ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO MIDDLE
EASTERN COUNTRIES ENGAGED IN
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INTRODUCTION
During the second half of the 20th Century, the Middle East
became the battleground for numerous, distinct wars - the
1962-1967 Egypt-Yemen War; the 1975-1990 Lebanese Civil War
and the Syrian intervention there; the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War;
and the 1990 Iraq-Kuwait War, to name a few. Yet, the Arab-
Israeli conflict has uniquely captured the world's attention as the
most complex and, hence, the hardest to resolve. The Middle
East peace process (a term now identified exclusively with the
attempts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, as opposed to all
other Middle East disputes) has required significant patience
and determination, coupled with ingenuity and creativity. Al-
most all the lessons learned through this process are directly ap-
plicable to attempts to resolve disputes in other parts of the
world. One of these lessons validates the importance of provid-
ing economic and developmental assistance to former enemies
as they transition from war to peace. This Article first examines
the role of economic and developmental assistance in the con-
text of peacemaking and then focuses on one specific innovative
economic assistance measure: the Qualifying Industrial Zone
("QIZ") initiative.
Part I of this Article describes how addressing the economic
requirements of the negotiating parties has interplayed with
their other requirements within the overall framework of peace-
making. Specifically, based on the experience gained over the
last thirty years of the Middle East peace process, this Part de-
* Joel Singer, a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of the law firm Sidley Austin
Brown & Wood LLP, helped the government of Israel negotiate the Oslo Accords with
the PLO as Legal Advisor to the Israeli Foreign Ministry for the Rabin-Peres govern-
ment from 1993 to 1996. He also played a central role in negotiating peace agreements
on behalf of Israel with Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon since the mid-1970s.
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scribes the overarching requirements that the parties have pur-
sued through peace negotiations. As explained below, former
Middle East warriors have always attempted to ensure that they
attain certain minimum political, security, and economic thresh-
old objectives in negotiating peace agreements. This Part of the
Article, then, articulates four "laws" of reconciling these three
requirements among competing interests, emphasizing the role
of economic assistance.
Part II of this Article examines a novel U.S. government ini-
tiative that has recently surfaced and gained more significance
among other economic assistance measures that have been of-
fered to proponents of peace in the Middle East. The QIZ initia-
tive by the U.S. government extends free access to the U.S. mar-
ket for goods comprised of components originating in the terri-
tories of former adversaries and manufactured inside a jointly-
administered QIZ, established along the borders of the former
enemies who are now engaged in peacemaking. The success of
the QIZ initiative, as well as the limitations on additional U.S.
government spending to support future Middle East peace
agreements, may result in the extension of the QIZ initiative to
additional borders separating former enemies throughout the
Middle East.'
I. SOME BASIC CONSIDERATIONS OF PEACEMAKING
A. Peace Is Attainable Only If Its Gains Are Greater Than Its Price
Most people tend to consider peacemaking to always be a
"win-win" situation - that is, one where all relevant parties stand
to gain and, therefore, cannot understand why the Middle East
peace negotiations take so long and often end without any re-
sults. This thought has been cultivated by many myths. One
myth is that the Middle East negotiating parties have failed to
reach an agreement because they have not talked to one another
and, therefore, all that one needs to do is put them in the same
room and close the doors until they reach an agreement. A sec-
1. This Article is an outgrowth of two presentations made by the author. Part I of
this Article is based on a presentation made by the author on April 9, 2002, at the
World Bank in the context of the Sustainable Development Month, entitled: "The Mid-
dle East Conflict: Can Development Advance Peace in the Middle East?" The full pres-
entation is available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/B-SPAN/subessd_peacesecur-
ity.htm. Part II of this Article is based on the presentation made by the author at the
2000 Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law.
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ond myth is that the parties have failed to reach an agreement
because of the lack of "chemistry" between the negotiators and,
therefore, all that one needs to do is replace them with more
charming negotiators. A third myth is that 90% of the barrier to
peacemaking is psychological and, therefore, all that one needs
to do is break the psychological barrier and peace can immedi-
ately be accomplished.
In fact, however, enemies will agree to make peace only if
they are each convinced that their respective interests will be
served. In other words, if the parties determine that peace-mak-
ing is not in their best interests (and, in fact, it takes only one of
the parties to so determine), no measure of face-to-face time,
"chemistry," or psychological barrier-breaking would change this
condition. Conversely, if the parties conclude that it is in their
interests to make peace, peace will be accomplished even if the
above-mentioned factors do not exist at all.2 Accordingly, to
reach peace, the parties must each conclude that they will be
better off if they accept the peace package offered, rather than
retain the state of war.
That neighboring countries may prefer the continuation of
war over peace appears inexplicable. Yet, peace-making is a
"give and take" process that not only involves gains, but also re-
quires many sacrifices.' Moreover, even if the "price is right,"
the concerned governments must also be able to "sell" the peace
agreement to their constituencies as a balanced package. Inabil-
ity to "sell" this package may cost the concerned leaders their
political careers4 or even their lives.' Accordingly, like in any
2. Thus, the 1974 separation agreements between Israel and Egypt, and Israel and
Syria, were reached on the basis of Kissinger's Shuttle Diplomacy, without any face-to-
face meetings between the parties. Similarly, the groundbreaking 1978 Camp David
Accords were concluded between Egypt and Israel, even though their two leaders, the
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin,
clearly could not stand one another and exchanged very few words throughout the
thirteen-day Camp David Summit Meeting. See generally WILLIAM QUANDT, CAMP DAVID,
PEACEMAKING AND POLITICS (Brookings Institution, 1986); BOUTROs BOUTROS-GHALI,
EcVI's ROAD TO JERUSALEM (1997).
3. President George H. W. Bush's address to the Middle East Peace Conference,
convened at Madrid, Spain, on October 30, 1991, and opened with the following sen-
tence: "Peace will only come as the result of direct negotiations, compromises, give-
and-take." The text of this address is reprinted in WILLIAM QUANDT, PEACE PROCESS
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SINCE 1967, 504, app.O (Brook-
ings Inst., 1993).
4. In 1995, the Rabin-Peres government managed to obtain an Israeli Knesset ap-
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other bargain, each side wants to ensure that, under the contem-
plated deal, its gains will be worth the price that it is required to
pay and the risks that it is required to take.
B. Political, Security and Economic Interests
The history of the Middle East peace process demonstrates
that each time a peace arrangement is offered, the question of
whether it objectively serves the respective Nations' interests, as
well as whether it is sellable to the respective constituents, is an-
swered based on the consideration of three main clusters of in-
terests: political, security, and economic.
The political interests are important to each side because of
national considerations. They include issues such as sovereignty,
borders, and holy places. The security interests are those that
must be protected by each side to secure its borders and to de-
fend its respective populations from external as well as internal
threats. The economic interests encompass those requirements
that are needed by the two sides to provide jobs and other eco-
nomic opportunities for their citizens, as well as to develop the
respective countries as a whole.
C. The Role of Economic Assistance
The manner by which the parties' economic needs have, in
the past, been satisfied falls broadly into three categories: (1) a
resumption of trade between the former enemies resulting from
the removal of wartime trade barriers and boycotts;' (2) an in-
proval of the Oslo 11 Agreement (Israel-PLO Interim Agreement on the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995, 36 I.L.M. 551 (1997)) with a majority of only one Knesset
member, and, a few months later, Peres lost the elections. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Barak was defeated dramatically in the 2001 elections after the extent of his concessions
to Chairman Yasir Arafat in the Camp David Summit had been leaked, even though
such concessions did not lead to any agreement.
5. In 1978, the Palestinian Liberation Organization ("PLO") representative to
London, Said Hamami, was assassinated after making remarks supporting peace with
Israel. In 1981, Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, was assassinated as a result of his
agreement to make peace with Israel in 1979. In 1982, Lebanese President, Bashir
Gemayel, was assassinated because of his willingness to make peace with Israel. In 1995,
Israeli Prime Minister, Itzhak Rabin, was assassinated because of his agreement to enter
into the Oslo Agreement with the PLO.
6. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, in the Middle East, this factor has been
almost negligible. Thus, the signing of the peace treaties between Israel and Egypt
(1979) and Israel and Jordan (1994) resulted in very little trade between these coun-
tries. This phenomenon is due to two main reasons. First, the economy of' Israel, on
2003] THE QUALIFYING INDUSTRIAL ZONE INITIATIVE 551
crease in trade between each of the former enemies and third
countries;' and (3) economic assistance provided by third coun-
tries, primarily the United States.
Economic assistance may take many forms and have many
objectives. In supporting Israel, U.S. assistance has been prima-
rily military (but it has also included aid for absorption of Soviet
and Ethiopian Jewish refugees).' On the other side of the spec-
trum, U.S. support for the Palestinians during the Oslo process
consisted primarily of funds provided through the U.S. Agency
for International Development ("USAID") to develop infrastruc-
ture projects in the West Bank and Gaza (such as for water
projects, schools, and road construction), and loan guarantees,
provided through the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corpora-
tion ("OPIC"), to support investments in privately-owned busi-
nesses in the West Bank and Gaza, as well as OPIC investments in
such businesses.9 U.S. support for Egypt and Jordan has con-
the one hand, and that of Egypt and Jordan, on the other hand, are not compatible; in
other words, there is not much demand in the markets of one for the products of the
other. See generally Israeli Ministry of Finance, Economic Outlook (Jan. 30, 2000), available
at http://www.mof.gov.il/hachnasot/eol_00/ (anticipating very little trade between
Israel and Syria if peace were to be accomplished between the two countries). This
conclusion is based on Israel's experience with exports to Jordan and Egypt, which
amount to only 0.4% of the total Israeli annual exports. Id. The 'paper adds that
"[m]ost of our neighbors' imports (from all origins) are consumer goods, whereas Is-
raeli exports (to all destinations) are typified by a very high proportion of high-tech
products." Id. Moreover, due to the lack of a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute,
the formal elimination of the Arab anti-Israel economic boycott in Egypt and Jordan in
the context of the two countries' peace treaties with Israel, has not gained popular
acceptance in these countries, As a result, the attitude regarding the purchasing of
Israeli products continues to be negative in the Egyptian and the Jordanian markets.
7. At least for Israel, this factor represented a major element of the "peace divi-
dend." Thus, following the signing of the 1993 Oslo Agreement and the 1994 Treaty of
Peace with Jordan, foreign investment in Israel grew sharply. According to Economic
Outlook, foreign investments in Israel increased from an average of US$100 million per
year up to 1991 to an annual average of US$3 billion from 1992-2000. Id. Foreign
investment in Jordan increased more than fourteen times to US$43 million between
1994, the year in which it signed a Treaty of Peace with Israel, and 1995. See Lori
Plotkin, Israel-Jordan Peace: Taking Stock, 1994-1997 (Wash. Inst. for Near East Policy,
1997). The general consensus in Jordan, however, is that Jordan missed out on the
opportunity to harvest the "fruits of peace" both in terms of attracting foreign invest-
ments, and in terms of accomplishing significant exports to Israel. See generally Fran-
cesca Sawalha, Seven years after treaty, Jordanians still looking for comprehensive peace, JORDAN
TIMES, Oct. 26-27, 2001.
8. See generally Clyde Mark, CRC REPORT FOR CONC.RESS/MIDDLE EAST: U.S. FOR-
EIGN ASSISTANCE (Mar. 28, 2002), available at http://fpc.state.gov.
9. Thus, immediately after the signing of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles
on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1525 (1993)
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sisted of a combination of military assistance and economic de-
velopment aid."0
D. The Four "Laws" of Attaining Peace Agreements
Keeping in mind the three requirements (political, security,
and economic) that the Middle East Nations have historically at-
tempted to attain through peace negotiations, this Article at-
tempts to decipher below certain patterns of successes and fail-
ures, based on four "laws," which the Author believes accurately
explain why certain attempts at peace have historically failed and
why others have succeeded.
1. The Parties Must Satisfy All Three Requirements
Looking at peace as a very heavy package that requires sub-
stantial support to lift from conflict, one can view these three
requirements as the ropes with which the parties lift the pack-
age. While each rope standing alone may be insufficient to lift
("Oslo I"), the U.S. government committed US$500 million to the West Bank and Gaza
through USAID and OPIC. See Secretary of State Warren Christopher's Remarks at the
Opening Session of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee Meeting, Washington, D.C. on
Sept. 29, 1995, reproduced in A Common Strategy for Economic Growth in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip, in 6 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH, no. 41, 725 (Oct. 9, 1995). See also Eco-
nomic Development and US. Assistance in Gaza/Jericho: Hearing before the Subcommittee on
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 104th Cong. 2
(1995) [hereinafter Economic Development and US. Assistance in Gaza/Jericho] (reporting
statements made by USAID's Assistant Administrator for Asia and the Near East and by
OPIC's Executive Vice President).
10. See Mark, supra n.8. Other members of the global community have also given
tremendous amounts of aid to economic development projects in the Middle East. For
example, the Border and Local Industrial Estate Development Program is a World
Bank project that was designed in the early- to mid-1990s to establish three industrial
zones in the West Bank and Gaza. In conjunction with that program, the Gaza Indus-
trial Estate was established at Karni with a US$10 million credit from the International
Development Association (World Bank), a US$5 million loan from the European In-
vestment Bank, and a US$6.3 million assistance package by the USAID. Other World
Bank projects in the West Bank and Gaza include the US$40 million Municipal Infra-
structure Development Project, the US$25 million Gaza Water and Sanitation Services
Project, the US$12.5 million Microenterprise Project, and the US$10 million Invest-
ment Guarantee Fund. Formed in 1994, the Hoist Peace Fund (named in honor of the
late Johan Jorgen Hoist, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, who was instrumental in bro-
kering the Oslo Agreement) served as a conduit for channeling donations from numer-
ous foreign countries for West Bank and Gaza projects. The Hoist Peace Fund was
taken over in 2001 by the World Bank's Palestinian Economic Assistance and Coopera-
tion Expansion ("PEACE") Facility. For a detailed description of the activities of the
Hoist Peace Fund, PEACE and other World Bank projects in the West Bank and Gaza
see the World Bank website, http://www.worldbank.org.
2003] THE QUALIFYING INDUSTRIAL ZONE INITIATIVE 553
such a heavy package, tying all three ropes around the package
may provide support sufficient to lift the package and to bring
peace."'
Prior to the historic visit of the Egyptian President Sadat to
Israel in 1977, peace between Israel and Egypt appeared to be
impossible, because Egypt was not prepared to meet Israel's min-
imum political requirements - recognition of Israel and estab-
lishment of full diplomatic relations with it - while Israel was
not prepared to meet Egypt's minimum political requirement -
full withdrawal from the Israeli-occupied Sinai Peninsula. Presi-
dent Sadat's trip to Israel and his address to the Israeli Knesset
in which he declared his readiness to recognize Israel and estab-
lish full peace with it, represented a quantum leap.' 2 Israel re-
ciprocated by fully meeting the primary Egyptian political re-
quirement of full Israeli withdrawal from the entire Sinai Penin-
sula. This change in the Israeli position became possible due to
the Egyptian willingness to accommodate Israel's security re-
quirements by agreeing to demilitarize the entire Sinai Penin-
sula.
Two of the three major requirements of the parties were
thus met, but a peace treaty was still extremely difficult to accom-
plish. The commitment to withdraw all of Israel's military bases
and civilians from the Sinai within a relatively short period im-
posed an enormous economic burden on Israel. Similarly, being
the first and the only Arab country to enter into full peace with
Israel, Egypt had to pay a clear political and economic price too,
because most of the other Arab countries considered Egypt's
11. This metaphor, used by the author in his presentation before the World Bank
Conference, draws upon a similar metaphor used by the Israeli Prime Minister Rabin.
See supra n.1. In describing his position in the context of the Israeli-Syrian negotiations,
Rabin likened the inter-relations between peace and security to a table with four legs:
"When I spoke to the Americans I said the negotiations with Syria have to be a package.
I compared it to a table with four legs: the depth of the withdrawal; the timetable; the
interface between [an initial] limited withdrawal [and normalization]; and full normali-
zation." Interview with Prime Minister Rabin, JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 5, 1994. Syrian Am-
bassador to the United States, Walid al-Moualem, who was the chief Syrian negotiator,
accepted Rabin's metaphor as the formula for Israeli-Syrian peacemaking. See Fresh
Light on the Syrian-Israeli Peace Negotiations, An Interview with Ambassador Walid al-Moualem,
26(2) J. OF PALESTINE STUDIES 81 (1997) [hereinafter Fresh Light].
12. SeeJOHN NORTON MOORE, THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, VOLUME IV: THE DIFFI-
CULT SEARCH FOR PEACE (1977-1988), PART ONE 77 (1991) (reprinting President Sadat's
address).
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step to be an act of betrayal.'" Thus, while Israel and Egypt
reached an agreement on two important clusters of interests
(political and security), they could not strike a deal. The price
that each had to pay and the risks involved in making peace were
too heavy for the expected gains. The U.S. government broke
the deadlock with an offer of significant economic assistance to
both parties.'" With all three "ropes" secured, the deal was
sealed, peace was wrested from conflict, and the parties have
maintained a peace, albeit a cold one, for more than two de-
cades.
From the end of the 1973 October War, it took Egypt and
Israel five years to conclude their peace treaty. Conversely, Syria,
which also participated in the 1973 October War, and Israel,
have failed to accomplish peace in the thirty years that passed
since 1973. The reason for this stark difference in outcome is
that the Israeli-Syrian calculus of incentives has so far been insuf-
ficient to make the peace equation work. Israel was not willing
to accept the vision of a cold peace, and the very limited security
arrangements offered by Syria were not an appropriate substi-
tute for giving up the strategic Golan Heights.' 5 To make mat-
ters worse, the United States clarified to the two parties that the
mood in Washington, at both the Administration and Congress,
was not supportive of an economic aid package to Israel and
Syria of a size even remotely resembling that provided to Israel
and Egypt from the time in which they signed their Treaty of
Peace." As a result, with very thin political and security ropes
13. Indeed, following the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement, Syria severed diplo-
matic relations with Egypt, and the Arab League decided to relocate its headquarters
out of Egypt. Egyptian interests throughout the Arab world were damaged.
14. Since the 1978 Camp David Accords, Israel and Egypt have been the first and
second largest recipients of U.S. military and economic aid. Every year, these two coun-
tries receive an aggregate amount of approximately US$5 billion. See Mark, supra n.8.
15. Concerned by the potential of a surprise attack, Israel asked Syria to substitute
the Golan with security arrangements, such as a wide demilitarized area (equivalent to
the demilitarization of Sinai under the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty) and an early warn-
ing station. Syria objected, claiming that a demilitarized zone would leave its capital,
Damascus, vulnerable to attack. Syria also rejected an Israeli early warning station on
the Golan as an infringement on its sovereignty. Additionally, Syria objected to Israel's
suggested full normalization in such spheres as commerce, transportation, and tourism
- similar to the agreements signed with Egypt - arguing that it had no such agree-
ments with its Arab neighbors and, therefore, saw no reason to have them with Israel.
See Fresh Light, supra nil.
16. See discussion of Camp David Accords, supra n.14.
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and a non-existent economic assistance rope, the parties did not
manage to lift the heavy peace package.
2. In the Event of Conflict Between Two or More
Requirements, the Parties Must Strike an Appropriate
Balance Between Conflicting Aims
In attempting to meet their political, security, and eco-
nomic requirements, the parties have inevitably run into con-
flicts between seemingly clashing goals. An attempt to strike an
appropriate balance between conflicting aims would seem neces-
sary for the parties to reach accord.
Some inconsistencies between conflicting requirements are
so fundamental that they are insolvable. Most conflicts, how-
ever, can be resolved on the basis of "give and take." Such trade-
offs may be accomplished narrowly within the perimeter of each
cluster of interests,17 or across two or more clusters of interests.'
Conflicts have most often surfaced between security interests
(normally those of Israel) and political" or economic interests
(normally of the Arab side). Those interests, however, are not
necessarily mutually exclusive. Some Israeli politicians have thus
supported the notion that, in some cases, 'accommodating the
economic interests of the Arab side on account of the short-term
Israeli security interests, may, in the long run, contribute to the
Israeli security interests. 2 1
A very interesting argument on that issue took place in the
Israeli Cabinet in the beginning of 1996 between Shimon Peres,
then the Israeli Prime Minister, and a high-ranking Israeli intelli-
gence officer. At that time, the Israeli and Syrian delegations
17. For instance, Israel and Jordan agreed to reciprocal exchanges of sovereign
territories along their international border.
18. For instance, Egypt agreed to flexibly accommodate Israel's requirements for
security arrangements, provided that Israel accepted Egypt's political requirement of
full Israeli withdrawal.
19. See e.g., Fresh Light, supra n. I1 (discussing the Syrian claim that an early warning
station in the Golan Heights would infringe upon Syria's sovereignty).
20. In 1970-1971, Moshe Dayan, then the Israeli Minister of Defense, suggested
that Israel unilaterally withdraw its forces from the Suez Canal to allow Egypt to reopen
the Canal, which had been closed since the 1967 Six-Day WVar, and rebuild the de-
stroyed Egyptian cities along the Canal. Dayan believed that accommodating Egyptian
economic interests would also provide a disincentive to an Egyptian war against Israel,
thus contributing to Israel's security interests. Dayan's initiative, however, had to wait
for the 1973 October War, two years later, with its thousands of casualties on both sides.
Only then was this idea accepted. See QUANDT, supra n.3, at 122-29.
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were negotiating at the Wye Plantation, near Washington, D.C.,
and the Syrian delegation objected to many of the Israeli-pro-
posed security arrangements. According to a story leaked to an
Israeli newspaper, Peres, apparently prepared to consider favora-
bly the more limited Syrian view of security arrangements, stated
at the Cabinet meeting as follows: "There is the economy and
there is the Army, and only a State which goes toward economy
will win. Between ten bunkers and ten hotels, ten hotels are also
a defense. I am for the European model which emphasizes
economies." 21
The Director of the Israel Defense Forces Intelligence Anal-
ysis Division, who also attended this Cabinet meeting, reacted as
follows: "I don't accept this. A hotel is important as long as there
is no war, but, when the other side decides to go to war, the
bunkers will decide more than the hotels...
The question of "hotels" versus "bunkers" was particularly
relevant to the negotiations between Israel and the PLO leading
up to the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area.23
At that time, different negotiators from each side were simulta-
neously negotiating the terms of two parts of this Agreement.
One group was negotiating the security provisions in Cairo,
Egypt,24 while the other group was negotiating the economic
provisions in Paris, France.2 5 From an objective viewpoint, one
21. HA'ARETZ, Jan. 29, 1996. See also Peres clashes with army general over peace with
Syria, Ac;. FR. PRESSE, Jan. 29, 1996; Syria's election impact, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 1, 1996;
Prosperity as peace bait, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 9, 1996.
22. HA'ARETZ, supra n.21. The author does not agree with either of these two posi-
tions. In the author's view, the question is not whether there should be ten bunkers
and not a single hotel, or ten hotels and not a single bunker. One should recognize
that building hotels contributes indirectly to security, because hotels provide jobs and
attract foreign investments, which all provide incentives to support peace. In the same
vein, building bunkers contributes indirectly to economic prosperity, because, without
bunkers, opposition forces who wish to undermine peace will have more freedom of
action, which will drive tourists away and, in turn, will lead to the inevitable demise of
hotels. In sum, the real question is how to appropriately mix hotels and bunkers while
ensuring that they support, rather than disrupt, each other.
23. Gaza Strip and Jericho Agreement, May 4, 1994, Israel-PLO, reprinted in 33
I.L.M. 622 (1994) [hereinafter Gaza-Jericho Agreement].
24. These security provisions were included in Annex I to the Gaza-Jericho Agree-
ment, entitled "Protocol Concerning Withdrawal of Israeli Military Forces and Security
Arrangements" [hereinafter Security Annex].
25. The economic provisions of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement were included in the
Protocol on Economic Relations, Apr. 29, 1994 [hereinafter Paris Protocol]. The Paris
Protocol is attached as Annex IV of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement and constitutes an
integral part thereof. See Paris Protocol, art. 1(2).
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can imagine that there would be inherent conflicts between the
security requirements that the Israeli government was primarily
attempting to meet, and the economic requirements that the
PLO was primarily attempting to meet. That is, the complete
freedom of movement required for Palestinian economic
growth, at least partially conflicts with security closures, road
blocks, or other similar measures required to allay Israeli security
concerns. However, perhaps because neither negotiating team
for the security provisions of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement was in
full communication with its national counterpart in the Paris
Protocol negotiations, the parties failed to address, much less
strike a balance between, these competing aims.
The failure of each side to address the requirements logi-
cally at odds with the requirements of its negotiating partner is
apparent on the face of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement. Central
provisions of the Security Annex and the Economic Annex (the
Paris Protocol) of the Agreement conflict in significant ways.
Most importantly, the Paris Protocol guarantees freedom of
movement among the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel for labor,2 6
agricultural produce, 7 and industrial goods.28 The Security An-
nex, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with the Israeli
security requirements and includes many provisions allowing
Israel to prevent entry of Palestinians to Israel.29
The author, who was then a member of the Israeli delega-
tion negotiating the Gaza-Jericho Agreement in Cairo, Egypt, re-
calls how he discovered that discrepancy just a few days before
the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement.3" This discovery led
to hectic phone calls among Cairo, Paris, Jerusalem, and Tunis
(the seat of the PLO headquarters before it relocated to Gaza),
intended to resolve the discrepancy. The agreed solution (in
the case of conflict between security and economic considera-
tions, the security considerations would prevail) was inserted in
Article XIII of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, which reads:
26. Id. art. VII.
27. Id. art. VIII.
28. Id. art. IX.
29. See e.g., Gaza-Jericho Agreement, supra n.23, art. VIII(l) and Security Annex,
supra n.24, art. VII(1) (c).
30. The Paris Protocol was executed in Paris on April 29, 1994, a few days before
the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement in Cairo, on May 4, 1994. The Paris Proto-
col was forwarded to the author for review only hours before it was signed.
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The economic relations between the two sides are set out in
the Protocol on Economic Relations signed in Paris on
April 29, 1994 and the Appendices thereto, certified copies of
which are attached as Annex IV, and will be governed by the rele-
vant provisions of this Agreement and its Annexes."
This technical resolution of a textual discrepancy does not
necessarily mean that the parties also managed to strike the right
balance between the competing economic and security require-
ments. While we cannot know whether or not the parties' failure
to strike a balance between competing aims was responsible for
the subsequent violence, one lesson learned is that a greater ef-
fort is required in this respect.
3. All Three Requirements Must Be Addressed Simultaneously
and not Sequentially
Not only must the parties address all three requirements in
their negotiations, but they must address them simultaneously.
Again, viewing peace negotiations as an attempt to lift a heavy
package, it is not enough to tie one thin rope after another. Any
attempt to lift the package must intertwine all three ropes availa-
ble - political, security, and economic - to lift the package.
Attempts to strike a peace deal have often failed in the Mid-
dle East even though the bargain offered was quite balanced in
terms of its substance. This failure has resulted from the fact
that one party, and often both, have sought to create a timeline
for the performance of the parties' various commitments in
which the other party first had to complete performance of its
obligations and only then, would the first party perform. Typi-
cally, Israel has demanded that, before it takes the irreversible
step of withdrawal from a territory, the other side must first
demonstrate its commitment to the deal by exchanging ambassa-
dors, beginning trade, etc. The Arab side, typically, presented a
diametrically opposed demand according to which, before
friendly relations could be established, Israel must first complete
its withdrawal from the occupied territory.
This dichotomy has often been resolved in the Middle East
peace negotiations by subdividing each of the parties' significant
commitments into increments and creating a schedule of per-
formance in which a balance was accomplished not only with
31. Gaza-Jericho Agreement, supra n.23, art. XIII (emphasis added).
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regard to the relative weight of the parties' "give and take," but
also with regard to the pace of performance.3 2 In creating a syn-
chronized schedule of performance of the parties' commit-
ments, it is extremely important to ensure that the provision of
economic assistance coincides with the other elements of per-
formance, and that it is not phased in well into the future. Peace
treaties can be sustained only if they receive popular support on
an ongoing basis. Common people normally do not read the
text of a peace treaty, but rather, make up their mind based on a
simple test: "What's in it for me?" If the economic situation im-
proves after a peace treaty is concluded, there is a good chance
that there will be popular support for peace. Conversely, if the
economic situation remains unchanged or even worsens, as was
the case in the West Bank and Gaza, the package will not hold
for long.
4. After the Parties Reach a Tentative Peace, They Must
Nourish the Three Requirements
to Sustain the Peace
As important as it is to adhere to the three laws discussed
above in order to strike a deal, it is no less important to continue
to nourish the political, security, and economic requirements of
the parties for quite a while to prevent the fragile peace reached
between the former enemies from collapsing. Before real peace
is fully consolidated, the disappearance of one of the ropes sup-
porting the package, for instance as a result of a violation by one
party of a fundamental treaty provision or a dramatic change of
circumstances, may cause the other ropes to get untangled and
the peace package to fall down and crash. This explains why,
twenty-four years after Israel and Egypt signed their peace treaty,
the United States still continues to support these countries with
very generous economic assistance. Similarly, once conditions
change and peace becomes possible among Israel, Lebanon, a
Palestinian State, and Syria, the world community will need to
help put together a long-term plan for economic support and
reconstruction, especially for the Palestinians.
32. That was one of the table's legs in Rabin's metaphor - the synchronization
between Israel's withdrawal and the normalization process. See Interuiew with Prime Min-
ister Rabin, supra n. 11.
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II. THE QIZ INITIATIVE
As noted above, the U.S. government has long been in-
volved in the negotiations in the Middle East, including by pro-
viding significant economic aid to parties engaged in negotia-
tions. We have seen just how important the U.S. economic aid
can be - American economic support can literally make or
break the parties' efforts to reach accord. One method of eco-
nomic assistance that has been particularly successful in reach-
ing and maintaining peace accords is the relatively recent and
very innovative QIZ initiative.
Begun in 1996, the QIZ initiative extends the same kind of
free access to the U.S. market for goods produced inside QIZs as
it does to Israeli goods under the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area
Agreement ("U.S.-Israel FTA"), provided that the goods are
made up of components originating in both Israel and its neigh-
bors.33 The QIZs consist of areas along the borders of Israel and
its former enemy countries.
A. Rationale of the QIZ Initiative
The QIZ initiative began to take shape in 1994-1995. It re-
sulted from the strong conviction of both the Congress and the
Clinton Administration that the economic aid requirements of
the West Bank and Gaza in the post-Oslo Agreement stage, and
Jordan in the post Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace stage, well ex-
ceeded the significant, yet insufficient, funds that the United
States was able to provide. Both the Congress and the Adminis-
tration were, therefore, looking for ways in which they could as-
sist the economies of the West Bank, Gaza, and Jordan without
having to raise the annual foreign assistance level.
A separate problem arose with regard to exports of the West
Bank and Gaza products to the United States as a result of incon-
sistencies among the various applicable export regimes. Thus,
the Paris Protocol, which established a Customs Union among
Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza,34 allowed Palestinian and Israeli
products to be shipped throughout the territories of Israel, the
West Bank, and Gaza, without the need to obtain a license or pay
33. U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area Agreement, April 22, 1985, repinted in 24 I.L.M.
645 (1985) [hereinafter U.S.-Israel FTA].
34. See Oren Gross, Mending Walls: The Economic Aspects of Israeli-Palestinian Peace,
15 AM. U. INT'L L. Rpv. 1539, 1598 (2000).
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customs duties, with a unified export/import licensing and cus-
toms regime applying to the outer envelope of these territo-
ries.3 5 Under the U.S.-Israel FTA, however, only Israeli products
were accorded free access to the U.S. market, 36 while Palestinian
products were denied such free access. More importantly, until
the West Bank and Gaza obtained economic autonomy through
the Oslo process, products of these areas were covered on a de
facto basis under the U.S.-Israel FTA, a practice that was subse-
quently stopped.3 ' To prevent the Palestinians from being pe-
nalized by that reality, the U.S. government extended preferen-
tial tariff rates to Palestinian goods under the Generalized Sys-
tem of Preferences ("GSP")3" in early 1995. That preferential
treatment was far from sufficient, as it did not cover textiles and
agricultural products, the two most important Palestinian export
products. Moreover, Congress did not reauthorize the GSP re-
gime in 1996."9 It thus became clear that the U.S. government
had to close the triangle by forming a U.S.-Palestinian facet to
supplement the U.S.-Israeli facet (the U.S.-Israel FTA) and the
Israeli-Palestinian facet (the Paris Protocol).
Initially, the U.S. government considered entering into an
FTA Agreement with the PLO. However, due to various legal
and practical considerations, that approach was replaced with a
decision that an FTA regime should be created for the West
Bank and Gaza through unilaterally extending, by legislation,
the Israel-U.S. FTA arrangements to also cover the West Bank
and Gaza.
While the considerations discussed above led to granting
preferential treatment to Palestinian products originating from
any place in the West Bank and Gaza, the Administration and
Congress took a more limited approach to Jordanian products.
With regard to the latter, the QIZ initiative was formed, limiting
the scope of the preferential treatment to products that were
manufactured in jointly-administered industrial zones along the
Israeli-Jordanian border. This unique feature of the QIZ initia-
35. Id.
36. U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act of 1985, 19 U.S.C. Sec. 2112
[hereinafter U.S.-Israel FIA Implementation Act].
37. See Mel Levine, Palestinian Economic Progress Under the Oslo Agreements, 19 FORD-
HAM INT'L L.J. 1393, 1413-1414 (1996).
38. 19 U.S.C. Secs. 2461-66.
39. Id.; see Levine, supra n.37.
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tive, as well as the permissible accumulation of Israeli and
Jordanian content for the purpose of calculating the QIZ rules
of origin,4 ° were designed to achieve two independent objec-
tives. First, free access to the U.S. market for Jordanian goods
promoted foreign and local investments in Jordan, which trans-
lated into jobs and profits for the Jordanian population. Sec-
ond, by rewarding Jordanian businesses that cooperated with Is-
raeli businesses, the QIZ initiative helped cement good neigh-
borly relations between Jordan and Israel at a very crucial time
when these two countries were transitioning from war to peace.
Even though the QIZ initiative was designed to support the
Jordanian and Palestinian peace accords, once the QIZ mecha-
nism was designed, Congress and the Administration decided to
add Egypt to the short list of benefiting countries, even though
the Egypt-Israeli Treaty of Peace was accomplished more than
fifteen years earlier, likely in order to reward Egypt for the sup-
port it had provided in the completion of the Oslo Agreements.
Most of the considerations discussed above were addressed
in close consultation among the relevant parties. Some of them
are reflected in the Congressional hearings that accompanied
the passage of the necessary legislation. Thus, in a hearing lead-
ing up to the 1996 passage of the QIZ initiative held by the U.S.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Subcommittee on
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Senator Brown noted:
As everyone in this room is keenly aware, a very high portion
of this Nation's foreign assistance budget is spent in the Mid-
dle East. Ensuring a lasting peace in that part of the world
has our utmost attention and our highest priority. It is essen-
tial that our priority be reflected in economic development in
the Gaza Strip. If it is not, if we fail here, it is likely that our
further efforts in the region to bring about peace will fail as
well. On the other hand, if we can succeed in Gaza, it is likely
that this success will bring about renewed efforts to ensure a
lasting peace in the region. 4 1
40. See Agreement on lrbid Qualifying Industrial Zone, art. 11 (c), as amended, Nov.
16, 1997,Jordan-lsr.. The Agreement is reproduced by the Jordan Export Development
& Commercial Centers Corporation ("JEDCO") and is available at http://www.jedco.
gov.jo/.
41. Economic Development and U.S. Assistance in Gaza/Jericho, supra n.9. While not
directly related to the QIZ initiative, the hearing was indicative of the mood on the
Capitol Hill toward U.S. economic assistance in the Middle East. Id.
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In a hearing to accompany H.R. 2371, which would have
amended the U.S.-Israel FTA Implementation Act and provided
for duty-free access to goods produced in QIZs a year earlier
than the bill that was subsequently adopted by Congress (H.R.
3074), the U.S. House Ways and Means Committee noted that
the bill contained the QIZ provision at the request of the Clin-
ton Administration. The Committee also noted that it "believes
that reducing tariffs in these [qualifying industrial] zones is im-
portant to the peace process, will increase employment, and will
stimulate the economy of the region. 4
2
In its Report to accompany H.R. 3074, the House Ways and
Means Committee noted that the QIZ provisions would "offer to
goods from the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and qualifying indus-
trial zones (located between Israel and Jordan or Israel and
Egypt) the same tariff treatment as is offered to Israel. ''43 During
the floor debate on H.R. 3074, Congressman Shaw stated:
The Israelis and Palestinians want peace for their people, se-
curity for every citizen and hope that they can peacefully co-
exist. It is very important for the United States and this Con-
gress to show their collective will that they will do all they can
do to further the peace process. The passage of this bill will
send a very clear signal to the international community that
we support normalized relations between the Israelis and the
Palestinians. The provisions of this bill will strengthen the Is-
raeli and Palestinian relation by providing economic and em-
ployment relief to that area and it will help the establishment
of a Palestinian [S]tate. 4
Likewise, a U.S. Senate Committee on Finance Report accompa-
nying H.R. 3074 noted that "[t] he Committee believes that pro-
viding duty free treatment to imports from the West Bank, the
Gaza Strip, and qualifying industrial zones is important to pro-
moting the peace process in the Middle East, increasing employ-
"145ment and stimulating the region's economy...
42. See Trade Agreements Authority Act of 1995: House Ways and Means Committee Re-
port, 104th Cong. 2 (1995). As to the content of H.R. 3074, see the immediately follow-
ing paragraphs, as well as infra Part IlI.B.
43. See Extension of Free Trade Benefits to the West Bank and Gaza Strip: House Ways and
Means Committee Report, 104th Cong. (1996).
44. Extension of Free Trade Benefits to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 142 (48)
CONG. REC. H3412, 3413 (Apr. 16, 1996).
45. Extension of Free Trade Benefits to the West Bank and Gaza Strip et al., H.
REP. No. 104-270, at 3 (May 13, 1996).
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It is apparent from the testimony accompanying the passage
of H.R. 3074, that the intent of the U.S. Congress in extending
free-trade benefits to products of the West Bank and Gaza, as
well as products of the QIZs, was to provide economic incentives
for the creation of joint ventures among Egyptians, Israelis,
Jordanians, and Palestinians, that ensure jobs and opportunities
for the local population. The message is clear - countries that
do business together have more of an incentive to resolve politi-
cal, economic, and security differences through peaceful negoti-
ations.
B. Mechanics of the QIZ Initiative
Pursuant to the U.S.-Israel FTA Implementation Act, almost
all Israeli products are entitled to entry into the United States
free of customs duties. 46 The U.S. Congress amended the U.S.-
Israel FTA Implementation Act to authorize the U.S. President
to proclaim duty-free treatment not only for Israeli products, but
also for products from the West Bank, Gaza, and certain QIZs. 47
Specifically, H.R. 3074 amended the U.S.-Israel FTA Implemen-
tation Act by adding a new Section 9(a), "Elimination or Modifi-
cation of Duties," which reads, in relevant part:
The President is authorized to proclaim elimination or modi-
fication of any existing duty as the President determines is
necessary to exempt any article from duty if
(1) that article is wholly the growth, product, or manufacture
of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, or a qualifying industrial
zone or is a new or different article of commerce that has
46. U.S.-Israel FTA Implementation Act, supra n.36. See generally Yair Baranes, The
Motivations and the Models: A Comparison of the Israel-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and the
North American Free Trade Agreement, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 145 (1997).
47. See Act to Amend the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act of 1985
to Provide the President with Additional Proclamation Authority with Respect to Arti-
cles of the West Bank or Gaza Strip or a Qualifying Industrial Zone, H.R. 3074, P.L. 104-
234, 110 Stat. 3058 (Oct. 2, 1996). Prior to enacting the amendment to the U.S.-Israel
FTA Implementation Act, the U.S. Congress had previously considered similar amend-
ments. A year earlier, the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and
Means had recommended that H.R. 2371 pass. See Trade Agreements Authority Act of
1995, H.R. REP. No. 104-285, pt. 1 (Oct. 20, 1995). Section 7 of H.R. 2371 would have
provided the President with similar proclamation authority to modify tariffs on prod-
ucts from the West Bank, Gaza, and QIZs. Id. at 20. In that version of the amendment,
the origin of goods covered by the amendment would be deemed to be Israel. See id. at
23 (citing to proposed, new Section 9 of the U.S.-Israel FTA Implementation Act of
1985).
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been grown, produced or manufactured in the West Bank,
the Gaza Strip, or a qualifying industrial zone;
(2) that article is imported directly from the West Bank, the
Gaza Strip, Israel, or a qualifying industrial zone; and
(3) the sum of
the cost or value of the materials produced in the West Bank,
the Gaza Strip, Israel or a qualifying industrial zone, plus
the direct costs of processing operations performed in the
West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Israel, or a qualifying industrial
zone
is not less than 35 percent of the appraised value of the prod-
uct at the time it is entered into the United States.
For purposes of determining the 35 percent content require-
ments contained in paragraph (3), the cost or value of mater-
ials which are used in the production of an article in the West
Bank, the Gaza Strip, or a qualifying industrial zone, and are
the products of the United States, may be counted in an
amount up to 15 percent of the appraised value of the arti-
cle.48
Section 9(e), in turn, defines a "qualifying industrial zone"
as any area that:
(1) encompasses portion of the territory of Israel and Jordan
or Israel and Egypt;
(2) has been designated by local authorities as an enclave
where merchandise may enter without payment of duty or ex-
cise taxes; and
(3) has been specified by the President as a qualifying indus-
trial zone.4 9
The new Section 9 of the U.S.-Israel FTA Implementation
48. U.S.-Israel FTA Implementation Act, supra n.36, Sec. 9(a). The Act further
defines a "new or different article of commerce" as an article that has been "Substan-
tially transformed into an article having a new name, character, or use." Id. Sec.
9(a)(2). The term "substantial transformation" is a term of art used in customs law
parlance that connotes an article or components of an article from one country, which
have been so transformed by manufacturing or assembly operations in another country,
that they cease being the old article or components of the article and become a new
article, originating in the country of manufacture or assembly. Substantial transforma-
tion determinations are heavily fact-intensive and are made by the U.S. Customs Service
("Customs") on a case-by-case basis.
49. Id. Sec. 9(e). The President has authorized the U.S. Trade Representative to
specify particular industrial zones under Sec. 9(e) as QIZs.
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Act authorizes goods produced outside of Israel to enjoy the
same duty-free access granted to goods produced in Israel, if the
goods are wholly the growth, product, or manufacture of the
West Bank, Gaza, or a QIZ. 5° As noted in Section 9(e), the pro-
cess of establishing a QIZ requires that the Israeli and the
Jordanian or the Israeli and the Egyptian authorities agree to
dedicate the territory along their respective borders to serve as a
jointly operated industrial park.5 Next, the local Israeli and
Jordanian or Israeli and Egyptian authorities must negotiate a
bilateral agreement that establishes how the parties wish to di-
vide the 35% minimum content requirements set by the U.S.
law.52 Once a bilateral agreement has been reached, the local
authorities designate the industrial park as an "enclave where
merchandise may enter without payment of duty or excise
taxes. '5' Finally, the parties submit their proposed QIZ to the
U.S. Trade Representative for a determination of whether the
industrial park will be designated as a QIZ.54
The incentives for foreign and local investment in these
newly extended regions are plain - the West Bank, Gaza, and
QIZs are magnets for companies that want duty-free access to the
U.S. market. For example, if a company sets up a manufacturing
facility of consumer electronic goods in a QIZ along the
Jordanian-Israeli border, it can import parts and components
50. The 1996 amendments to the U.S.-Israel FTA Implementation Act authorized
the President to accord duty-free treatment to goods from the West Bank, Gaza, or
QIZs. President Clinton so authorized duty reductions via Presidential Proclamation in
November 1996 by modifying the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States
("HTSUS"). See Proclamation No. 6955, 61 Fed. Reg. 58, 761-58, 765 (1996).
51. See U.S.-Israel FTA Implementation Act, supra n.36, Sec. 9(e)(1) (requiring
that a QIZ encompass portions of the territory of Israel andJordan or Israel and Egypt).
52. Jordan and Israel agreed on a mechanism for dividing the 35% minimum con-
tent betweenJordanian and Israeli manufacturers according to one of the following two
ways:
(1) Of the 35% minimum QIZ content, at least one-third (11.7%) must be added
by aJordanian manufacturer in the QIZ, and 8% (or 7% for high-tech products) by an
Israeli manufacturer(s). The remainder of the 35% content (namely, 15.3%) may be
fulfilled by production in the QIZ, the West Bank, Gaza, Israel, or the United States;
(2) Alternatively, Jordanian and Israeli manufacturers must each maintain at least
20% of the total production cost of the QIZ-produced goods.
See Agreement on Irbid Qualifying Industrial Zone, supra n.40, art. 11(c)
53. See U.S.-Israel FTA Implementation Act, supra n.36, Sec. 9(e) (2).
54. Id. Sec. 9(e) (3) (requiring that the area designated by local authorities be
"specified by the President [acting through the U.S. Trade Representative] as a qualify-
ing industrial zone").
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from any country in the world into the QIZ and assemble those
parts and components into a finished electronic product. As
long as those parts and components undergo a "substantial
transformation ' 55 and the 35% minimum value requirement is
met,56 the finished product is eligible for duty-free access into
the U.S. market.57 On the other hand, if the parts and compo-
nents were assembled in their country of origin, the finished
product would be ineligible for duty-free access under the U.S.-
Israel FTA Implementation Act.5" Because duty-free treatment
often provides for savings of three-to-five percent or more of the
55. See id. Sec. 9(a) (2); see also discussion of "substantial transformation," supra
n.48.
56. The 35% minimum value requirement in Section 9(a)(3) is found in most
agreements that the United States signs with free-trade partners or other beneficiary
countries to ensure that products of other countries are not merely trans-shipped
through partner or beneficiary countries to the United States. For example, the Gener-
alized System of Preferences ("GSP") program authorizes duty-free entry of goods that
are the growth, product, or manufacture of certain listed beneficiary developing coun-
tries. See 19 U.S.C. Secs. 2461-66. The GSP program requires a minimum value require-
ment of 35% to reap the benefits of the GSP duty-free treatment. In the case of the QIZ
initiative, note that Section 9(a) allows part of the 35% minimum value requirement in
the case of a QIZ to consist of goods of U.S. origin. Because goods of U.S. origin may
make up to 15% of the value of an imported good, in effect only 20% of the appraised
value of the imported article must actually be attributable to the QIZ, the West Bank,
Gaza, or Israel.
57. Goods that enter the United States under the QIZ initiative may be shipped
either fromJordan or Israel. Importers must declare the origin of the imported goods
as either 'Jordan" or "Israel" and must indicate on the entry documents that the goods
are the growth, product, or manufacture of a QIZ. Note that the rules of origin for
textile products of QIZs differ from the rules of origin for other products. The rules of
origin for textiles are found in Section 102.21 of the Customs Regulations, or 19 C.F.R.
Sec. 102.21. These textile rules are based on the tariff shift, or on the location where
the textile product was wholly assembled. Importers of goods that enter the United
States under duty-free access accorded to the West Bank or Gaza must declare the ori-
gin as "West Bank/Gaza." See Country of Origin Marking of Products from the West Bank or
Gaza, 62 Fed. Reg. 12269 (Mar. 14, 1997) (noting that the U.S. State Department con-
siders the West Bank and Gaza to be "one area for political, economic, legal and other
purposes"); see also Country of Origin Marking of Products from the West Bank or Gaza, 60
Fed. Reg. 17607 (Apr. 6, 1995) (requiring that goods be marked as either the product
of "West Bank" or of "Gaza Strip").
58. The finished product may be eligible for duty-free access to the U.S. market
under other free-trade arrangements or beneficiary programs into which the United
States has entered. For example, if the parts and components were substantially trans-
formed in Jordan outside a QIZ, the finished product may be eligible for duty-free
treatment under the U.S.-Jordan FTA Implementation Act. See P.L. 107-43, 115 Stat.
243 (Sept. 29, 2001); see also 19 U.S.C. Sec. 2112. Nonetheless, the QIZ initiative may
still offer incentives for production inside the QIZ overJordan, because the U.S-Jordan
FTA Implementation Act provides for staged duty reductions for many products.
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value of the imported goods, the benefits of shifting production
or assembly of goods to a QIZ are tangible and immediate-
manufacturing capability inside a QIZ are a boon to businesses
that want to ship to the United States.
C. Success of the QIZ Initiative on the Ground
The success of the QIZ initiative, even in tense current cir-
cumstances, validates the notion that U.S. economic assistance
in the Middle East peace process can serve as an effective means
of securing and maintaining peace on the ground. Despite the
violence in the Middle East, the QIZs are functioning smoothly
and are continuing to provide their communities with hope and
opportunity.5 9
There are presently eleven industrial parks along the
Jordanian-Israeli border that have been designated by the U.S.
Trade Representative as QIZs. ° Since their establishment, the
Jordan Industrial Estates Corporation ("JIEC") has estimated
that the eleven QIZs have created 20,000 new jobs, have at-
tracted millions of dollars of capital investment to Jordan, and
have more than doubled Jordan's exports to the United States.6'
59. A 2001 JORDAN TIMES article addressing the issue of whether the Jordanian
expectations for the "fruits of peace" had been fulfilled, referred to the Jordanian QIZs
as "the biggest 'fruit of peace' so far," adding that:
Employing 14,000 Jordanians, the QIZs have developed massively this year in
spite of regional violence. Official figures show that exports from the QIZs
over the first half of 2001 reached JD125 million, and projections suggest that
the JD250 million mark will be crossed by year-end ... Estimates also suggest
the QIZs could create 100,000jobs and attract up to U.S.$10 billion in foreign
investments over the next 10 years.
Sawalha, supra n.7.
60. The eleven designated QIZs are: (1) Irbid Qualifying Industrial Zone. See 63
Fed. Reg. 12572 (Mar. 13, 1998), expanded by 64 Fed. Reg. 13623 (Mar. 19, 1999); (2)
Gateway Projects Industrial Zone. See id.; (3) AI-Kerak Industrial Estate. See 64 Fed.
Reg. 56015 (Oct. 15, 1999); (4) Ad-Dulayl Industrial Park. See id., expanded by 66 Fed.
Reg. 32660 (June 15, 2001); (5) Al-Tajamouat Industrial City. See 64 Fed. Reg. 56015
(Oct. 15, 1999); (6) Jordan Cyber City Co.. See 65 Fed. Reg. 64472 (Oct. 27, 2000); (7)
Aqaba Industrial Estate. See id.; (8) Mushatta International Complex. See 65 Fed. Reg.
77688 (Dec. 12, 2000); (9) El Zay Ready Wear Manufacturing Company Duty Free Area.
See id.; (10) Al Qastal Industrial Zone. See id.; and (11) Zarqa Industrial Zone. See 66
Fed. Reg. 32660 (June 15, 2001). There are no QIZs along the Israeli-Egyptian border
primarily due to Egypt's current disinclination to enhance economic cooperation with
Israel.
61. The Jordan Industrial Estates Corporation ("JIEC") was established by the gov-
ernment ofJordan to encourage the establishment of industrial projects inJordan. It is
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D. Future of the QIZ Initiative
The QIZ initiative has enjoyed great success on the ground,
and the United States should be guardedly optimistic that the
extension of the QIZ concept to other borders in the Middle
East could encourage parties to resolve differences through po-
litical negotiations. Due, in large part, to the success of the QIZ
initiative, the U.S. Congress is presently considering a second
amendment to the U.S.-Israel FTA Implementation Act that
would authorize the President to also extend duty-free treatment
to goods produced in QIZs to be established in Turkey.6 2 Signif-
icantly, not only is Turkey not a former enemy of Israel, but it
does not even have a common border with Israel. Yet, the U.S.
Congress has shown interest in promoting economic coopera-
tion between Israel and Turkey, through the extension of the
QIZ initiative to Turkey, likely because Turkey is considered an
important, pro-Western Middle Eastern country that is friendly
with both Israel and the United States.
Although the bill, discussed below, did not reach the floor
in the 107th Congress, supporters believe that it could be re-
introduced in the 108th Congress. Specifically, Section 2002 of
H.R. 5385 would have amended Section 9(e)(1) of the U.S.-
Israel FTA Implementation Act by "striking 'Israel and Jordan'
and inserting 'Israel and Turkey, Israel and Jordan.' '63 The
House bill contained several notable exceptions for goods from
Israel-Turkey QIZs that would be eligible for free-trade benefits.
Specifically, Section 2002 stated that:
(b) Section 9 of the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area Implementa-
tion Act of 1985 (19 U.S.C. § 2112), is amended ...
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
(f) Articles That May Not Be Exempted From Duty
The President may not proclaim under subsection (a) elimination
or modification of any existing duty with respect to any article
charged with licensing industrial parks for duty, fee, and tax exemptions under
Jordanian law and multilateral agreements.
62. See Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 2002, H.R. 5385,
Sec. 2002 (2002) (engrossed as agreed to or passed by the House). In addition, H.R.
5002 was introduced as a stand-alone bill to provide for identical extension of QIZ
benefits to Turkish-Israeli industrial parks. It was introduced and referred to the House
Committee on Ways and Means on June 24, 2002. This bill was eventually subsumed
into the Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 2002, H.R. 5385.
63. Id. Sec. 2002(a).
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that is wholly the growth, product, or manufacture of a quali-
fying industrial zone that encompasses portions of the terri-
tory of Israel and Turkey or is a new and different article of
commerce that has been grown, produced, or manufactured
in a qualifying industrial zone that encompasses portions of
the territory of Israel and Turkey, if such article is within any of
the following categories of import-sensitive articles:
(1) Textile and apparel articles that were not eligible arti-
cles for purposes of title V of the Trade Act of 1974 on
January 1, 1994, as such title was in effect on such date.
(2) Footwear, handbags, luggage, flat goods, work gloves, and
leather wearing apparel that were not eligible articles for
purposes of title V of the Trade Act of 1974 on January 1,
1995, as such title was in effect on such date.
(3) Any other article that the President determines to be
import-sensitive.64
Exclusions of textile, apparel, and leather products from
free-trade benefits under the Israel-Turkey QIZ initiative re-
sulted from protectionist pressure from domestic industry inter-
est groups.6" Domestic steel producers groups have also per-
suaded several congressional members to argue for excluding
steel products from the extension of free trade benefits under
the QIZ program.
H.R. 5385 did not pass in the 107th Congress due to the
inability of the U.S. Senate to consider the bill in its "lame duck"
session. Because of the importance of numerous provisions in
the Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 2002,
a substantially similar bill containing the Israeli-Turkish QIZ ini-
tiative may be introduced soon after the 108th Congress con-
venes in January 2003. The details of the Turkey QIZ initiative
may change somewhat, but many congressional members expect
any such bill to contain a provision for the extension of QIZ free-
trade benefits to Turkey.
64. Id. at Sec. 2002(b) (emphasis added).
65. For example, the American Textile Manufacturers Group ("ATMI"), a national
trade association of U.S. textile manufacturers, opposed extending the QIZ program to
Turkish textiles. See ATMI, 50 TEXTILE TRENDS: THE WEEKLY WASHINGTON REPORT FOR
ATMI MEMBERS, no. 24 (June 24, 2002), available at http://www.atmi.org.
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CONCLUSION
The novel QIZ initiative validates the old adage that neces-
sity is the mother of all inventions. Born out of the need to
quickly support the economies of Middle Eastern countries in-
volved in peacemaking at a time in which the U.S. foreign assis-
tance program could not be significantly expanded, the QIZ ini-
tiative has had two major accomplishments: (1) it has success-
fully promoted foreign investments in the region; and (2) it has
helped consolidate good neighborly relations between former
enemies.
The new Turkish QIZ initiative demonstrates that the QIZ
concept may be extended to additional locations in the Middle
East, as part of the overall U.S. economic assistance to support
the Middle East peace process.
